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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

**Security Committee**X SECOM-M-271 *Cmc - 5*

14 September 1983

Minutes  
Two Hundred and Sixty-seventh Meeting  
Wednesday, 14 September 1983, 1000 - 1200 Hours  
Room 4E64, Langley Headquarters Building

[Redacted]  
Chairman  
Presiding

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MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Robert C. Allen, Department of the Navy  
Mr. Maynard Anderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Mr. James Callahan, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force  
Mr. Lloyd E. Dean, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Col. Robert B. Huey, Jr., Department of the Air Force  
[Redacted] Central Intelligence Agency  
[Redacted] Defense Intelligence Agency  
Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Department of Justice

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ALTERNATES PRESENT

[Redacted] National Security Agency  
Mr. Thomas H. Blankenship, Department of Energy  
Mr. Edward J. Dansereau, Department of the Treasury  
Mr. Frank Dill, Department of the Army  
Mr. Dan Downum, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Capt. William C. Horn, Department of the Navy

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ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Gerald L. Berkin, Department of the Navy  
[Redacted] Central Intelligence Agency  
[Redacted] National Security Agency  
[Redacted] Central Intelligence Agency (C)  
[Redacted] Central Intelligence Agency (C)  
[Redacted] Central Intelligence Agency (C)  
[Redacted] National Security Agency  
Mr. Franklin Standifer, Department of Justice (DEA)  
Mr. Donald Stigers, Department of State  
[Redacted] Executive Secretary

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SECOM Staff

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Preliminary Comments

The Chairman:

A. Introduced Colonel Robert Huey as the new Air Force member and new Chairman of the Compartmentation Subcommittee. [redacted]

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B. Informed members that the DCI had promulgated the new nondisclosure agreement for SCI on 30 August. [redacted] invited attention to copies at members' places of the promulgation memo and agreement. He stressed the importance of paying particular attention to paragraph 3 of the promulgation memo enjoining care and timeliness in referring to the concerned Community agencies SCI and other intelligence materials submitted for prepublication review. [redacted]

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C. Reported that on 1 September the Acting DCI decided to maintain the 15-year period of coverage for DCID 1/14 investigations and promulgated the revised DCID reflecting that decision. [redacted] noted that copies of Mr. McMahon's memo were at members' places, and advised that the DCID is being prepared for printing and dissemination. [redacted]

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D. Advised that during August he had presented to several CIA components the DCI's videotaped presentation concerning leaks of intelligence and seeking cooperation in stopping leaks. [redacted] noted that he was scheduled to give this presentation during September to senior officials at the Department of Justice, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. October presentations are scheduled for the Army and an industry group. He suggested that progress in controlling leaks could result from these and similar efforts by raising the Community's level of consciousness of leaks' harmful effects. [redacted]

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E. Stated that the FY 85 budget guidance level for SECOM had been reduced again. [redacted] noted that we had started with [redacted]. He said the impact on computer and technical security would be severe. [redacted] stressed the need for members to monitor the status of budgeted funds to ensure timely obligation, and to guarantee that funds which are not obligated by the last month of the fiscal year are reallocated immediately to other essential projects. He noted in this connection that SECOM budgeted funds allocated to a subcommittee in March 1983 had been returned in early September with the advice that they couldn't be obligated by the end of this year. He noted that steps were underway to obligate them to the Community effort to develop an advanced countermeasure receiver - a major SECOM project and the only one which needed both additional funds and was capable of using them this late in the fiscal year. [redacted]

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F. Informed members that the NSC Staff had convened a group to draft a proposed NSDD to realign responsibilities for communications security. [redacted] noted that the first draft NSDD apparently would assign

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responsibility for computer security to a new COMSEC body which would replace the NCSC. He said the CIA Office of Communications was monitoring this matter. He asked members to keep him informed of anything they heard on this subject. [ ]

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G. Noted that Mr. Fred Wood, project director for the polygraph report being done by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, had sent him a copy of the draft report for review. [ ] said it was a detailed analysis of available source material focusing on criminal and commercial applications of the polygraph and on polygraph research experiments. He noted that the study acknowledges that the polygraph is not a "lie detector" per se, but observed that this could be overlooked in the verbiage.

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[ ] stated that he planned to thank Mr. Wood for the review opportunity, and to tell him (1) that those Community agencies which use the polygraph for screening advise they don't use chart indications of stress reactions as the sole basis for adverse security determinations; (2) that there is no uniform Community policy on polygraph use; and (3) that agencies which use the polygraph as an adjunct to screening programs would be better able than SECOM to comment substantively on the report's relevance to such use. [ ] said his final response might differ. [ ] and Anderson said they had noted many errors in the report. Mr. Anderson advised that Defense planned to point out some of those errors, but would not attack the report's credibility. [ ]

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H. Advised that some senior staff officers in CIA - including the Executive Assistant to the DCI - who drill with an Air Force Reserve unit asked him if SECOM has any projects, such as the leak study, they could work on during their once-a-month weekend drills. [ ] advised that he had told UDIS members about this at their 13 September meeting, and had asked them to consider the offer seriously. Mr. Anderson stated that Defense made extensive use of reservists, and assigned one or two regular personnel to supervise weekend work. [ ] asked for suggestions from members on potential uses of this group. [ ]

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#### ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes

The minutes of the 3 August 1983 meeting were approved as written, subject to correction of typographical errors on pages 1, 2 and 4. Corrected pages will be disseminated with these minutes. [ ] (Registry)

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#### ITEM 2 Subcommittee Reports

A. Computer Security - [ ] reported that they held a special meeting to analyze data from Community agencies on funded and unfunded computer security projects and on current and expected FY 84 computer security organizations. [ ] stated that responses had been received only from CIA, Energy, DIA and Army. He noted the need for the remaining agencies to respond to ensure comprehensiveness of the data, and to meet the schedule which calls for SECOM members to review the proposed compilation at the October seminar prior to submission to Dr. Ruth Davis. [ ] urged those agencies which had not yet responded to do so promptly. [ ] said the recent cuts in our budget request had forced us to lump the remaining

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funds by major disciplines with specific project allocations to be determined later. [ ]

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B. Personnel Security - [ ] reported that the 10th adjudicators seminar had met all expectations. He noted comments by participants in favor of forming a professional adjudicators' association. He noted that SECOM members have not fully supported the "senior panel" presentations at recent seminars. [ ] asked that any member scheduled for senior panel participation advise him if he is unable to keep his commitment, so that a suitable substitute can be found. [ ] said the next seminar was scheduled for 31 October - 4 November 1983. [ ]

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C. Physical Security - Mr. Berkin reported that members and alternates at the pilot seminar held August 8-12, 1983, had suggested adjustments to course content which would be reviewed and approved at a forthcoming meeting of the working group. He said participants wanted to stress coverage of hardware items, such as alarms, and construction criteria. Mr. Berkin advised that they planned to divide future attendees into small groups to participate in practical exercises, such as on alarming SCI facilities. Attendees would report on the approach they had taken and then would be led to a textbook solution by the course coordinator. [ ] said the course seemed likely to meet our objective of promoting homogeneity in Intelligence Community physical security practices. [ ]

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D. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures - [ ] reported that the low bid for ITC construction was considerably less than the budgeted level. He said the bidder had a good performance record. His bid was accepted and construction will start soon. Mr. Dean reported on results of a 9 September meeting he had with Chief Powell of the Capitol Police. He said the meeting was useful in clarifying what the Capitol Police are prepared to do regarding training of their officers in technical surveillance countermeasures. Mr. Dean advised that Chief Powell pledged his support to the plan to train his officers, but noted that Captain Boyle, with whom we had initially discussed this plan, has been transferred, and that Captain Bell, now in charge of the technical detail, may soon be moved as well. Mr. Dean advised that the Capitol Police had not meant us to understand that they would commit 12 officers to TSCM training - only that they had 12 officers responsible for security and that TSCM matters would be added to their duties as a group. He reported that the FBI brought a number of these officers to FBI Headquarters for two weeks' basic instruction in electronics. This resulted in 5 officers being selected by the USCP to take a 5-week course at ITC beginning 12 September. Mr. Dean advised that Capitol authorities had made adequate space available on the Hill as a base for TSCM activities, and had obtained [ ] in budgeted funds for the purchase of equipment. He stated that he thought the Capitol Police would be unable to develop full competence in TSCM unless the Army followed through on the earlier plan to provide on-the-job training. He advised that the FBI plans to include at least one trained Capitol Police officer in the FBI technical teams when they do a sweep preparatory to FBI sensitive testimony. [ ] said CIA technical security had invited similar participation, but without acceptance so far. Mr. Dean said senior Capitol Police officials were supportive of the program, and participation could probably be arranged through them. [ ] said he was encouraged by Mr. Dean's report. [ ]

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E. Unauthorized Disclosures Subcommittee - [ ] reported that the leak study is close to a point where it can start. [ ] CIA, will be the study director, assisted by [ ] from NSA and [ ] from DIA. [ ] said success would depend on team members getting full and timely access to leak records at Community agencies. He advised that UDIS is working toward a new charter. The main issue is the mission statement. OSD and DIA want to limit it to leaks; others want it to include unauthorized disclosures generally. [ ] commented that differences on this point might be influenced by IG/CM approaches to damage assessments and counterintelligence. He noted the potential for political problems if the charter indicated that the subcommittee's focus was on material appearing in the media. [ ] advised that Community responses to a request for data on their programs for investigating and following up on leaks showed a relatively low level of effort. He noted, however, that this might reflect lack of records rather than lack of effort. [ ] said his presentations to senior officials on the leak problem usually prompted questions on the number of leaks and results of efforts to identify culprits, etc. He stated that the Community should be prepared to respond accurately to such questions. [ ] noted that the form developed by [ ] to capture in computer format data on leaks could be the beginning of a useful system to respond to such questions. [ ] complimented the Department of State for the thoroughness with which they had investigated a leak in response to a SECOM request. He noted that the proposed DCI legislative package did not include a bill which would criminalize Government personnel who leak. He said inclusion of such a bill was being explored. Mr. Allen asked if the Reserve intelligence unit could be used to try to establish specific damage resulting from leaks. [ ] noted that access to damage assessments would be hard to obtain. [ ] described an unsuccessful Community effort in the 1970s to do that sort of thing. [ ]

Mr. Rubino and Mr. Anderson said we need to address the often ignored requirement in E.O. 12356 (section 5.4(d)) that unauthorized disclosures be reported to the Director, ISOO. [ ] said the issue is what needs to be reported to ISOO. He noted that ISOO needs much less data on leaks than does the Department of Justice. Mr. Rubino said Justice recognized that such things as active espionage cases could not be reported to ISOO while they were pending. He suggested SECOM members discuss this issue at the October seminar. Members agreed to this and to [ ]'s suggestion that Mr. Garfinkel be invited to participate in that discussion. [ ]

[ ] noting prior SECOM agreement that we should advise the IG/CM that SECOM should not be involved in damage assessment matters, advised that he had not sent a memorandum so stating on the advice of [ ] [ ] advised of a recent proposal received from Mr. Snider in Defense which apparently would involve SECOM and ISOO in damage assessments. He said he did not think the proposal would result in suitable changes in policy. Members suggested that candor in commenting on it would be the best approach. [ ]

### ITEM 3 Polygraph Study

[ ] reported that the Personnel Security Subcommittee met on 22 and 31 August to develop a proposed study plan. He reported that they agreed

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to limit the study to the 1 January 1980 - 1 September 1983 period; to have it cover in narrative form the results of polygraph use in applicant screening, in leak investigations, and in counterintelligence cases; and to include personnel security data from other sources. He advised that they plan to cover 50 cases drawn from CIA, NSA, FBI, Army, Navy and Air Force experience. He said a study which covered measurably more than that number would be unbalanced in favor of CIA and NSA experience. A 5 December 1983 deadline was set for completion of the study, and a tasking memorandum has gone out to subcommittee members.

[ ] asked if SECOM members had any questions about this plan. None was voiced. He asked members to soft pedal the fact that SECOM is arranging such a study in order to try to avoid premature demands for results while the study is still in progress and before we have had chance to analyze reported experience. [ ]

#### ITEM 4 Unofficial Travel to Yugoslavia

Col. Huey reported on Compartmentation Subcommittee consideration of NSA's request for review of this issue in light of the 1984 Winter Olympics to be held in Yugoslavia and of the agreement between Yugoslavia and U. S. Forces in Europe offering cheap tour packages for military personnel. He advised that a Department of State representative reported that Yugoslav security personnel were active in targeting U. S. diplomats there, and that increased and more aggressive targeting was expected. Col. Huey said the consensus of subcommittee members was that Yugoslavia should remain on the SECOM list of hazardous areas and that current DCI policy on travel or assignment to such areas provided adequate security guidance. He advised that concern had been expressed that the Community should be asked to consider special reminders to their SCI-accessed personnel about potential security problems if they traveled to Yugoslavia. [ ] asked members if they wanted a notice on this prepared for the DCI to send the Community. Members indicated that they did. Col. Huey was asked to draft a proposed DCI memorandum to provide this notice. [ ]

#### ITEM 5 Security Awareness & Education Subcommittee Charter

[ ] noted that copies of the draft charter had been sent to members with the agenda. Members indicated their approval of it. [ ]

#### ITEM 6 SECOM Seminar Topics

[ ] invited members to review the list at their places of tentative discussion topics for the October SECOM seminar. He invited brief discussion, and asked members to advise him no later than 21 September of any comments they had on these topics and any suggestions they had for additional ones. He also asked members to advise [ ] whether they would attend the seminar, or, if unable to do so, who they proposed to send in their stead. Members expressed interest in including subcommittee status reports as part of the seminar. They were assured that this would be done. [ ] asked if the four tentative discussion topics were agreeable. Members said they were. [ ] noted the need to discuss at the seminar what computer security data we would provide for DDCI use in connection with the Dr. Ruth Davis study. [ ] advised members that a final agenda for the seminar would be sent to them as soon as practicable. [ ]

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ITEM 7 New Business

A. [ ] advised that we had recently learned of problems occasioned when a staff member of one agency is briefed into a special access program by a second agency, but the parent agency of the briefed person is not advised of the new access. [ ] and Mr. Anderson said they had encountered the same problem. Mr. Anderson reported that Gen. Stilwell had sent a corrective notice on this to Defense components. [ ] suggested that a practical means of dealing with this problem would be to place the principal burden on the briefed person to notify his or her parent agency of the new access. Mr. Anderson said he had encountered cases in which the agency granting the new access enjoined newly accessed personnel not to inform their parent agencies. Members discussed the privacy capabilities of the 4C System as a means of dealing with this problem while maintaining security. In response to requests, Mr. Anderson agreed to send the SECOM staff a copy of Gen. Stilwell's notice for dissemination to SECOM members. [ ]

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B. Mr. Rubino advised that the Department of Justice is establishing 12 Drug Enforcement Task Forces in the U. S. to go after organized trafficking. He noted that intelligence support from the Community would be one of the main weapons used. He said his staff was making the personnel and physical security arrangements required for use by these task forces. He noted that SECOM members might become involved in implementation in their capacities as security directors. He invited members to call him about any problems that may arise in this area. [ ]

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ITEM 8 - Next Meeting

[ ] reminded members that the annual seminar for SECOM members and staff will be held on Tuesday and Wednesday, 11-12 October 1983, [ ] He said [ ] would be in touch concerning administrative details. He advised that efforts were underway to arrange an evening social gathering (5:30 - 7:30 p.m.) for SECOM and subcommittee members and their spouses on Thursday, 17 November, in the Executive Dining Room at CIA, at a cost of \$7.00 per person. Data on reservations and payment will be provided later. He asked members to note on their calendars the SECOM Christmas lunch, scheduled for 14 December at Ft. McNair.

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[ ] stated that another regular business meeting was needed this year. He proposed and members agreed, to schedule this for Wednesday, 16 November, at the usual time and place. [ ]

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16 September 1983

## SECOM CALENDAR

September

7	Computer	09:30	Jefferson
13	UDIS	10:00	7D-32 Hqs
13	SAG/USSR	10:00	2435 State
14	SECOM	10:00	4E-64 Hqs
21	Physical Security	10:00	4E-64 Hqs
21	SECOM (Special Meeting)	1:30	7D-64 Hqs
20	Computer Security	09:30	Jefferson
22	R&D	1:30	Jefferson

October

6	Security Awareness	10:00	7D-32 Hqs	
11 & 12	SECOM Seminar	Two Days	<input type="text"/>	STAT
25	UDIS	10:00	7D32 Hqs	

November

31-4 Nov	Adjudicators' Course	All Week	<input type="text"/>	STAT
16	SECOM	10:00	4E-64 Hqs	
17	Social Event	5:30-7:30	Executive DR	

December

14	Christmas Luncheon	11:30	Ft. McNair
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